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A B S T R A C T
Periodic peat and forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan result in haze that blankets Indonesia and neighboring
countries, with effects on human health, the environment and the economy. Although the prevailing approach
for preventing and reducing the incidence of fire in Indonesia is regulatory, village-level incentive schemes have
been trialed by agribusinesses and pulp and paper companies to prevent burning. In this article, we review one
integrated incentive program for villages launched by a pulp and paper company in Riau, Sumatra, in 2015. As
part of the study, we surveyed six of the villages that participated in the first year of the program as well as six
non-program villages, complemented by spatial analyses of hotspots and burn scars. Our analyses show a de-
clining pattern of burning in the years prior and including 2015, followed by the almost total cessation of
burning in the years after. During 2015, a severe El Niño event, the program villages experienced 40% fewer
fires, while in non-program villages, there were 23% more fires. The main reason cited by the villages was the
increased awareness of the regulations in force prior to the program. The information about these laws and
regulations had been disseminated to program villages, as well as some of the adjacent non-program villages,
prior to the commencement of the incentive program. The transition to non-burning livelihoods was enabled by
ongoing changes in the landscape to permanent agricultural crops such as oil palm and rubber, as well as non-
farming livelihoods. Although the benefits of the program were valued at the community level, the incentives
appeared to function as a pathway for incentivizing compliance with prevailing regulations rather than inducing
voluntary behaviors. We argue that the current trend for strict environmental regulations undermines the po-
tential for using voluntary incentives. Consequently, we suggest that future incentive schemes should focus on
providing agricultural support to smallholders to enable them to adapt to the strict requirements of the en-
vironmental regulations in force.
1. Introduction
Periodic fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, often exacerbated by El
Niño events, have led to smoke haze covering Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore as well as Brunei (Gaveau et al., 2014; Kusumaningtyas and
Aldrian, 2016; Tacconi, 2016). The human health effects of these fires
include respiratory illnesses, eye irritation and skin diseases (Marlier
et al., 2012), which can increase the mortality rate among those af-
fected by the haze (Crippa et al., 2016; Koplitz et al., 2016). Fires also
cause significant greenhouse gas emissions (Heymann et al., 2017), and
affect biodiversity and peatlands (Marlier et al., 2015; Tacconi, 2016).
Forest fires can burn the forest canopy as well as disrupt the decom-
position system in the forest, leading to the decline of the forest system
in the long-term (Kinnaird and O'Brien, 1998). Fires can also burn the
litter layer on the surface of the soil, exposing it to erosion and chan-
ging the soil composition (Ahlgren and Ahlgren, 1960). These changes
affect the regeneration of saplings and also increase the vulnerability of
the forest to invasive, exotic species (Kinnaird and O'Brien, 1998). In
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addition, fires can endanger wildlife by disrupting their habitat
(Kinnaird and O'Brien, 1998; Nepstad et al., 1999; Wharton, 1966).
The amount of greenhouse gases emitted from forest fires depends
on several conditions, particularly the type of soil on which fire occurs.
Fires in peatlands produce higher carbon emissions compared to fires in
mineral soil due to the high organic carbon content beneath the surface
(Agus et al., 2011). It has been estimated that the 1997 fires in In-
donesia during the El Niño event released between 0.81 and 2.57 Gt of
carbon emissions to the atmosphere (Page et al., 2002), whereas the
2015 fire events during the El Niño season produced an estimated
0.75 Gt (Heymann et al., 2017) to 0.81 Gt (Pribadi and Kurata, 2017) of
carbon emissions. The economic consequences of fires in Sumatra and
Kalimantan have been significant for both industrial and small-scale
farmers and plantations. The damages from recent major fire events in
1997 and 2015 are estimated to have cost Indonesia approximately US
$2.8 billion in 1997 (Glover and Jessup, 1999; Tacconi, 2003) and US
$16.124 billion in 2015, equivalent to 1.8% of Indonesia's GDP in 2014
(Tacconi, 2016). These figures take into account many negative impacts
such as declines in agricultural and forest productivity as well as
tourism, disturbance in air and ground transportation, respiratory
health issues and school closures. Due to their significant greenhouse
gas emissions, the Indonesian Government has identified reducing the
incidence of fires as part of the broader strategy for reducing emissions
from land uses and forestry in its Nationally Determined Contribution
(NDC) (Republic of Indonesia, 2016).
Since the fires of 1997 and 1998, the causes and effects of
Indonesian fires have been studied extensively (Carmenta et al., 2017;
Cattau et al., 2016a; Dennis et al., 2005; Purnomo et al., 2017; Sloan
et al., 2017; Tacconi, 2003, 2016; Vayda, 2006). In normal periods,
high humidity and limited dry vegetative matter means that there are
very few natural sources of fire, as opposed to Australia, North America
or Europe. During El Niño events as well as dry spells in non-drought
years (Gaveau et al., 2014), however, the drier conditions enable fires
to quickly spread through forests and peat areas. The transnational haze
that results from fires, especially with the higher levels of particulate
matter from peat fires, has focused attention on how to prevent the
outbreak of these fires (Tacconi et al., 2007; Tacconi, 2016). The main
causes of large scale escaped fires that have been identified are the use
of fire for land clearing by both small-scale farmers and industrial land
uses, including forestry operations and timber plantations, and agri-
cultural plantations, including oil palm plantations (Dennis et al., 2005;
Purnomo et al., 2017; Sloan et al., 2017; Tacconi, 2003, 2016; Vayda,
2006; Wooster et al., 2012).The focus on these causes has informed the
design and implementation of policies and regulations for reducing the
incidence of fires in Indonesia. These include regulations banning the
use of fire for land clearing (Gokkon, 2015) and more recently, a
moratorium on new oil palm and mining concessions (Chan and
Soeriaatmadja, 2016). The moratorium is expected to stop the expan-
sion of oil palm and mining concessions and, consequently, would curb
the use of fire for land clearing and, subsequently, large escaped fires
(Satriastanti, 2016).
Although there are many actors, with differing motivations, re-
sponsible for the ignition and spread of fires in Indonesia, in our study
we focus specifically on one group of actors, rural communities.
Indonesian farmers, historically, have relied on burning as the main
method for clearing and managing their lands, and restricting the use of
fire without adequate incentives and alternatives could adversely affect
poorer households. Consequently, in this paper, we discuss the potential
of village-level incentives to be used for preventing and reducing the
incidence of fire among rural communities. Historically, the dominant
approach to fire prevention in Indonesia has been issuing regulations
that prevent the use of fire. Incentives, in this context, represent a de-
parture from previous and ongoing efforts for fire prevention. We re-
view the case study of a program in Riau Province (Sumatra), launched
by a pulp and paper company, APRIL, which is called the Fire Free
Village Program. The program involves a mixture of incentives,
community engagement and support for sustainable agricultural alter-
natives, and it was launched in the months prior to the major fires of
2015. Following the fires, Presidential Instruction No.11/2015 on the
Increased Control of Land and Forest Fires was issued, and it forms the
basis for the imposition of a total fire ban, including those used for
agricultural purposes (Rogers, 2016). The fire season of 2015, conse-
quently, represents an interesting case study in using voluntary fi-
nancial incentives for fire prevention during a major El Niño event. The
research aims to understand the conditions under which village level
incentives are effective for reducing the incidence of fire among rural
Indonesian communities. The study addresses the following questions:
i) Did the villages included in the FFV Program experience a significant
reduction in fire events compared to other villages located in the vici-
nity of APRIL's plantations and which were not covered by the FFV
Program? ii) If there was a significant reduction in fire events in FFV
Program villages, what are the factors that contributed to that reduc-
tion?
This study provides input for a more nuanced policy towards
burning by rural communities in Indonesia and, as a result, it also in-
forms efforts aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting biodiversity. This research also contributes to the literature
on payments and rewards for environmental services in tropical forest
regions by analyzing when and where incentives are effective in com-
parison with regulatory instruments or support for alternative liveli-
hoods.
We begin with a brief survey of the causes of fires in Indonesia and
the potential of financial incentives for fire prevention, followed by a
discussion of the case study of the Fire Free Village Program in Riau
Province, Indonesia.
2. The causes and consequences of burning in Indonesia
The causes of fire in Indonesia range from commercial land clearing,
clearing and other burning by small-scale farmers and unintentional
escaped fires (Carmenta et al., 2017; Dennis et al., 2005; Tacconi, 2003,
2016). Although the exact contribution of small-scale and commercial
producers is uncertain (Gaveau et al., 2017; Sloan et al., 2017; Tacconi,
2016), fire has an ongoing and historical role in small-scale farming in
Indonesia. Swidden farming systems, still common in many parts of
Indonesia, used fire as both an efficient tool for clearing forests and
scrub while returning nutrients to the soil (Verma and Jayakumar,
2012). Fire is also used in grassland to promote the regrowth of grass
for cattle grazing, as practiced widely in the Eastern Indonesian islands
of Sumba and Flores islands and to improve visibility for hunting
(Chokkalingam and Suyanto, 2004; Tacconi and Ruchiat, 2006). The
use of fire, therefore, helps sustain the livelihoods of people. The
burning practices that have been adopted indicate that local people
have a significant level of knowledge about the use of fire. It is still
unknown, however, whether local people have full knowledge of the
long-term positive and negative impacts of burning. Without the use of
fire, certain farming and grazing systems may no longer be financially
viable for local communities (Tacconi and Ruchiat, 2006).
The decline of swidden agriculture and the shift to more intensive
land uses (Cramb et al., 2009; Mertz et al., 2009) has not eliminated the
use of fire in Indonesia. Rather, fire has retained its instrumentality as
an efficient means for clearing land as well as a simple method for
evading Indonesia's complex and restrictive policies for land use and
forest management. This is reflected in the use of fire for the expansion
of industrial land uses. The first, and most controversial, use of fire in
this scenario is for the establishment of timber and oil palm plantations
as fire is a cheap and quick tool to clear land (Gouyon et al., 2002;
Simorangkir, 2007). Analyses of the causes of large fire events in the
late 1990s and early 2000s indicated that this was a major cause of fire
(Tacconi et al., 2007). A more recent study of fires in Kalimantan,
however, found that most fires (68–71%) originated in non-forest areas
rather than concessions and that fires started within concessions tend
J.D. Watts, et al. Forest Policy and Economics 108 (2019) 101956
2
be contained (Cattau et al., 2016a). This may reflect, however, better
land management practices by concessionaires in the period since the
1997 fires, including the introduction of certification standards, such as
from the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) (Carlson et al.,
2017; Cattau et al., 2016b). Similarly, in 2015, the land ownership of
where most of the fires occurred was unclear, with 55% of the burnt
area not belonging to defined stakeholders (Tacconi, 2016). More re-
cently, a study has described a process where burning is the first step of
making land claims in areas where there is unclear tenure, following
which, the lands are then traded for the purposes of cultivation, in-
cluding oil palm (Purnomo et al., 2017). Smallholders, in contrast, may
continue to burn as they have few alternatives for clearing land or ac-
cess to subsidized fertilizers and pesticides to replace the functions of
burning at an affordable price (Brandi et al., 2015; INOBU, 2016).
3. Fire prevention in Indonesia and the potential for community
incentives
The Government of Indonesia has attempted to reduce the incidence
of fires by issuing a number of regulations since the 1980s. In 1995, the
Minister of Forestry, through Decree No. 188/Kepts-II/1995, estab-
lished the National Centre for Forest Fire Control to control fires inside
forest areas. In 1996, the Minister of Environment formed the National
Coordinating Team for Land Fire that focused on fire outside of forest
areas. Additionally, the Minister of Environment issued Decree No.
Kep.-40/MenLH/09/97 to form a National Coordinating Team for
Forest and Land Fire Control to address fires that occurred inside and
outside of forest areas (Herawati and Santoso, 2011). This was
strengthened by Act No. 41/1999 that bans corporations from clearing
land for oil-palm plantations by using fire. In addition to national
policy, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution pro-
vides a platform for international cooperation in monitoring and pre-
venting fire incidents, while Singapore's Transboundary Haze Pollution
Act considers the businesses responsible for haze pollution that reaches
Singapore as criminals, and both instruments were already in place
prior to the 2015 fires (Cattau et al., 2016a). The continued occurrence
of significant fire events demonstrates that these laws have had limited
effectiveness. Following the 2015 fires, the Indonesian President issued
Presidential Instruction No. 11/2015, increasing the control of land and
forest fires and forming the basis for the imposition of a total ban on
fires, coupled with stronger law enforcement efforts.
The regulatory approach has both advantages and disadvantages.
The regulatory approach does not address one of the causes of major
fire events during 2015, which were escaped fires from unmanaged,
idle lands that have no clear ownership (Cattau et al., 2016a). For the
Ministry of Environment and Forestry, sanctions are easier to apply to
registered companies with clearly defined concession boundaries than
investigating the causes and actors responsible for fires in unmanaged
lands. This may reflect the methods used for detecting fires, which rely
heavily on satellite imagery and concession maps, and field investiga-
tions are often met with resistance by local communities (Liljas, 2016).
These methods, however, have limited effectiveness too, as there are
often mismatches between de jure and de facto land occupancy both
inside and outside of concession boundaries (Gaveau et al., 2017).
Despite the successes in prosecuting many companies for fires in 2015,
none of the companies prosecuted had actually paid a fine by early
2017 (Jong, 2017). Small-scale farmers are also targeted as part of fire
bans, however, usually by local patrols such as the Forest and Land Fire
Task Force, or Satuan Kebakaran Hutan dan Lahan (SATKARHUTLA),
which is a collaboration among the police, military and other agencies
for fire prevention (Rohadi, 2017). Enforcing fire bans also raises issues
of equity. Commercial operations have more resources to use me-
chanical clearing methods and adhere to environmental standards, in-
cluding certification schemes such as the RSPO certification scheme,
than small-scale farmers (Brandi et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2012). The
alternative proposed methods for clearing are often not appropriate or
accessible for small-scale farmers, especially swidden farmers, which
has led to farmers either abandoning their land or continuing to burn in
secret (Rohadi, 2017).
Incentives, targeted at smallholders and communities, could have
the potential to support fire prevention while mitigating the adverse
effects on poor farming households. Payments for Environmental
Services (PES) have been proposed and used for voluntarily solving
environmental problems, including watershed protection, forest and
ecosystem restoration and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Sloan
et al., 2018; Tacconi, 2012; Wunder, 2015). Empirical studies that have
evaluated the effectiveness of financial incentives in conservation re-
port mixed results (Wunder et al., 2018). It is therefore important to
investigate if incentives for fire prevention could motivate and enable
smallholders to shift from using burning to alternative practices that do
not require using burning, as well as considering the limitations of in-
centive programs.
The Fire Free Village (FFV) Program in Pangkalan Kerinci district in
Riau Province (Sumatra Island, Indonesia) launched by the APRIL
Group is a community engagement scheme for fire prevention. The
APRIL Group is a major manufacturer of pulp and paper and owns
natural and planted timber plantations throughout Indonesia. In re-
sponse to frequent fires affecting their plantation forests, the APRIL
Group implemented a new scheme for reducing the use of fire in
communities surrounding their plantations. One of the five programs
includes No Burn Village Rewards, where a full reward of IDR
100,000,000 is given to the village community, through the village
government, under the condition that fires do not occur within the
village boundaries during the dry period, usually from July to October.
A half reward, amounting to IDR 50,000,000, will be given to the vil-
lage community if the burnt areas are maintained below 2 ha, and no
reward will be given if the burnt areas are larger than 2 ha. The com-
munity decides the allocation of the funds to a high priority community
initiative through village meetings, which are led by the village gov-
ernment and attended by various representatives of village commu-
nities. The use of the reward funds is not restricted to fire prevention or
suppression activities or equipment. Rather, the receiving villages are
given the freedom to use the rewards in a way that is deemed beneficial
for the village communities. Other components of the FFV Program
include: appointing a local fire crew leader in each village, awareness
raising programs, air quality measurements, and providing alternative
technologies for land clearing (Table 1). Selected villages are eligible
for the No Burn Village Rewards for 2 years and will enter the Fire
Table 1
Fire free village program in Riau, Indonesia.
Year commenced 28 July 2015
Location Pangkalan Kerinci, Riau, Indonesia
Incentive program
features
• No Burn Village Rewards calculated on annual basis:• Full Reward (IDR 100,000,000) if no land burned• Half Reward (IDR 50,000,000) if < 2 ha of land burned• No Reward if > 2 ha of land burned• Use of rewards decided through community meetings
Other features Village crew leader, Sustainable agricultural assistance,
Community fire awareness, Air quality monitoring
Performance
indicators
• Contribution to the reduction in burnt areas• Contribution to short term positive engagement with
local communities• Contribution to long term community cultural shift,
education & mindset change• Contribution to long term economic sustainability of
local communities to earn not burn• Contribution to APRIL return on Investment
Implementing
agencies
APRIL; 2 local non-government organizations - Rumah
Pohon and Blue Green; Masyarakat Peduli Api (MPA);
Local government; Police; Military, The Provincial
Disaster Mitigation Agency (BPBD)
Target groups 9 villages surrounding APRIL's concession in Riau
Source: (APRIL, 2016).
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Resilient Community (FRC) phase in the third year, where they will no
longer be eligible for the rewards but will continue to receive support
from APRIL for the other components of the program.
An initial review of the program has pointed to promising success in
some aspects of the program, while encountering limited success in
others (APRIL, 2016). Overall the review found that the program ap-
pears to have led to a reduction in the incidence of fire in the villages
surrounding the plantations that had been included in the FFV Program.
The program was planned prior to the extensive fires of 2015, and
implementation started just after the beginning of the fire season in
July 2015. The new administration of President Joko Widodo re-
sponded to the fires and subsequent haze by issuing a Presidential In-
struction No. 11/2015 that banned burning, including by smallholders.
The regulation was implemented strictly in Riau, with harsh penalties
for farmers caught burning.
4. Methods
4.1. Village selection
The Program villages were sampled based on whether they received
a full, half or no reward for reductions in burning during the first year
of the program, which coincided with the El Niño event (Table 2). Non-
program villages were sampled according to their similarity with the
program villages selected, including size and relative risk according to
APRIL's risk assessment map. Geographically, the villages are all lo-
cated in the same region and most villages were directly adjacent or
proximate with one another (Table 3). In 2016, Asian Agri, a palm oil
company that belongs to the same Royal Golden Eagle International
Group as APRIL, also launched a Fire Free Village Program, which in-
cluded two of the non-program villages, Segati and Lalang Kabung
Village (Asian Agri, 2017). As the program started in 2016, it would not
have affected the behavior of communities during the 2015 period.
Fire is heavily influenced by the presence and extent of particular
land use/covers, such as degraded forests and peatlands, at least where
these are proximate to agricultural activities (Cattau et al., 2016a; Sloan
et al., 2017). To assess the comparability of our FFV Program villages
and non-program villages in this respect, we quantified the areas of
various land use/cover classes in each village. Classes were pre-
dominantly according to visual interpretations of Landsat and SPOT
satellite imagery of ca. 2015 for peatlands (Miettinen et al., 2016a).
This interpretation defined ten land use/cover classes (Table 4)
(Miettinen et al., 2016a). Around 40% of the total area of the five Non-
program Villages (mostly within Segati and Kerumutan villages) were
not visually interpreted because they were not situated on peatlands
mapped by Miettinen et al. (2016a) – all other village areas were on
peatlands thus defined and so visually interpreted accordingly. For
areas not on peatlands, we quantified land use/covers using the Mod-
erate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) land-cover clas-
sification of Miettinen et al. (2016b). The land use/cover classes of the
MODIS classification were equated to those of the Landsat/SPOT visual
interpretation according to Table A.1.
In general, sets of FFV Program and Non-program villages are
comparable overall with respect to their relative frequencies of different
land covers (Table 4). Similarly, as expected among adjacent villages,
the relative frequencies of different livelihoods (e.g., farming, fishing,
small business) and agricultural land uses (e.g., oil palm, rubber) were
highly comparable among the two village sets overall (Tables 11 and
12; discussed later). Considering these points as well as the fact that
both village sets are predominantly peatland, it is plausible that both
sets of villages also experience similar types mixes of fire ‘types’,
namely small agricultural fires on peatlands. Such overall comparability
should not be interpreted to mean that inter-set differences in fire
patterns have been totally ‘controlled’ per se. Variations among vil-
lages, including among villages of a given set, remains considerable
(Tables 4 and 12) and the small number of villages as well as the open-
ended nature of the surveys in this study preclude statistical controls of
village-level attributes effecting burning (Gaveau et al., 2013). In this
light, the survey presented below provide an exploratory and qualita-
tive analysis of the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in reducing the
incidence of fire.
4.2. Village survey protocols
The study provides exploratory report of the motives and dynamics
by which villages reduced burning activities during the first year of the
FFV Program. For a set of ten village in Pangkalan Kerinci district, split
evenly between Program villages during the first year of the FFV
Table 2
Burnt areas and 2015 reward status in FFV program villages.
Villages Burnt area (Ha – APRIL) Total FFV program reward
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Sering 50 30 11 91 No reward
Kuala Tolam 100 30 0.15 0.8 131 Half reward
Kuala Panduk 122 87 209 Full reward
Teluk Binjai 70 30 0.7 101 Half reward
Teluk Meranti 200 83 21.2 304 No reward
Segamai 300 250 10.5 561 Full reward
Bold indicate the year of focus for the study
Source: APRIL Group.
Table 3
Data for FFV program and non-program villages.
Village/administrative village Administration type Population (households/Individuals) Area (ha) Road access Nearest palm oil mill (km)
Village Administrative village Easy Difficult
FFV program villages
Sering x 506/1822 9113 x 0–20
Kuala Tolam x 321/1138 32,981 x 41–80
Kuala Panduk x 520/1567 23,994 x 0–20
Teluk Binjai x 400/1500 48,531 x 21–40
Teluk Meranti x 1100/3000 160,231 x 81+
Segamai x 288/1040 4563 x 41–80
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir x 600/2400 3844 x 0–20
Lalang Kabung x 637/2639 7119 x 0–20
Kerumutan x 1431/5376 43,538 x 0–20
Mak Teduh x 503/1985 31,444 x 0–20
Pangkalan Terap x 200/800 26,238 x 0–20
Segati x 2700/6000 75,281 x 0–20
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Program and adjacent villages that were not part of the scheme, the
study employed a range of open-ended survey methods to solicit opi-
nions on the dynamics underlying reductions in burning within
Program villages following the implementation of the Program.
In each village, focus group discussions and five individual inter-
views were conducted with respondents that broadly reflected the li-
velihood diversity of the village. The focus group discussions involved
village leaders and representatives of the main livelihood and occupa-
tional cohorts, including those with a direct link to landscape burning
(e.g., farmers). The focus groups discussed topics including livelihoods
and land uses, including uses of fire as well as participants' perceptions
regarding the incentive program. Interviews with individual re-
spondents were similarly structured, although without questions re-
garding the general profile of the village. The respondents were selected
based on their representativeness of different livelihoods and occupa-
tions, including farmers, fishermen and entrepreneurs, within the vil-
lage. The results of the focus group discussions and individual inter-
views from both non-program and program villages were used to
compare individual and collective perceptions, especially regarding the
causes of fire, the reasons for stopping and the benefits of the program.
Based on our literature review and preliminary fieldwork, we
identified four potentially confounding factors that could affect the
results from any study of the effectiveness of the incentive program.
These four factors were:
• Environmental conditions such as El Niño events and droughts that
increase fire risk (Gaveau et al., 2014; Tacconi, 2016);• Strictly enforced regulations for prohibiting burning (Rohadi, 2017);• Actual and alternative livelihood systems (Cramb et al., 2009;
Tacconi et al., 2007); and• Unrestricted community financing initiatives such as the Village
Fund (Antlöv et al., 2016), which could dilute the effects of the
incentive scheme.
To try to mitigate these confounding factors, we selected the year
2015 as the study period. That year was the first year of the program, as
well as coinciding with the major El Niño event, but also the year before
the Presidential Instruction that banned burning was enforced nation-
wide. According to national regulations issued prior to the Presidential
Instruction, smallholders were allowed to burn as part of their
livelihood activities. To identify the conditions that enabled farmers to
switch to non-burning livelihoods, we analyzed their transitions in li-
velihoods as well as any outside support that may have been provided,
including corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. The study
period also coincided with the launch of the Village Fund, a national
program designed to provide unrestricted funds to villages largely for
infrastructure development. Administrative villages were excluded
from the scheme. We also specifically asked respondents in villages to
describe the benefits of the village fund and, specifically in the program
villages, compare with them the FFV Program incentives to identify the
additionality of the incentives.
4.3. Fire activities at the village level, 2013–2017
Respondents' accounts on the means and efficacy of burning sup-
pression were complemented with remote sensing data on the annual
burned extent within the village boundaries over the period of
2013–2017 annually. The extent of burn scars across the villages was
calculated using the latest Collection 6 version of the MODIS Terra and
Aqua-combined global burned area product (MCD64AI) data (Giglio
et al., 2009). The data describes the area burned according to the Terra
and Aqua sensor from 500m MODIS surface reflectance and 1 km
MODIS active fire observations (Giglio et al., 2009). The burned pixels
were identified by applying a threshold based on the vegetation index
(VI) from shortwave infrared (SWIR) band of MODIS satellite image and
temporal texture measurement (Giglio et al., 2009, 2015). The burned
pixel represents the burned area within a given year of observation
(2013–2017), excluding missing data and water bodies at 500m re-
solution.
These burn scar data were also compared against separate active-
fire ‘hotspot’ data, derived from 1 km MODIS data, for the same period
(Giglio et al., 2016). Kernel density involves clustering the points based
on the distance from each point based on a mathematical function
(Anderson, 2009). Kernel density was used to visually represent annual
hotspot density regardless of the village administrative boundaries.
5. Results
The analysis of hotspots and burn scars indicates a trend of de-
clining incidence of fire over the years 2013–2017, with at least 90%
Table 4
Area of land use/cover classes in the fire-free program and non-program villages.
Village Ocean/
water
Seasonal
water
Pristine PSF Degraded PSF Tall shrub/
secondary PSF
Fern/low
shrub)
Smallholder
agriculture
Plantation Cleared/
burned
Total area
(ha)
Non-program
Lalang Kabung – – – 663 325 – 1719 3863 550 7119
Pangkalan Terap 350 338 10,869 4325 75 150 3394 6119 619 26,238
Mak Teduh – 169 11,106 6894 1694 13 869 10,644 56 31,444
Kerumutan – 856 9588 11,344 1819 513 4044 13,756 1619 43,538
Segati – – 13 21,600 – – 25,825 8956 18,888 75,281
Benteng Hilir 31 – – 869 – – 663 2206 75 3844
Total non-program 381 1363 31,575 45,694 3913 675 36,513 45,544 21,806 187,463
Total non-program
(% total area)
0% 1% 17% 24% 2% 0% 19% 24% 12% 100%
FFV program villages
Kuala Tolam 450 – 2756 6581 438 938 2475 18,631 713 32,981
Segamai 6 – – – 69 – 3150 1338 – 4563
Sering 556 – 550 1206 138 – 3756 2100 806 9113
Teluk Meranti 8181 1844 24,394 70,994 2219 4769 6150 39,206 2475 160,231
Kuala Panduk 331 206 11,719 4513 – 225 2625 4338 38 23,994
Teluk Binjai 2056 19 25,694 10,844 544 – 3350 6013 13 48,531
Total FFVP 11,581 2069 65,113 94,138 3406 5931 21,506 71,625 4044 279,413
Total FFVP (% total
area)
4% 1% 23% 34% 1% 2% 8% 26% 1% 100%
Note: ‘PSF’ refers to Peat Swamp Forest. ‘Ocean/Water’ refers to inlet rivers extending from the ocean through the study villages. See Table B.1 for aerial measures of
each land-use/cover class by village.
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reduction of hotspot and burnt area in 2016 (Tables 5 and 6, and
Fig. 1). These trends apply both to the program and non-program vil-
lages. During 2015, the program villages experienced 40% less fires,
while in non-program villages, there were 23% more fires. These figures
suggest that the program had some positive effect during its first year.
The data have some limitations as the actual village territory or the area
controlled by the community may not match the boundaries provided
by the Central Statistics Agency. The fire incidents recorded by the
different sources do not exactly align, reflecting the limitations of using
hotspot data to measure fire occurrence as well as the discrepancies
between the different methods. Despite these differences, most of the
data indicate a steady decline in fires until and including 2015, the first
year of the FFV Program.
The results from the interviews confirm the trend of declining
burning with the main determinant of stopping burning was the
awareness of the legal consequences of burning. The results from the
village-level focus group discussions (Table 7) and individual
interviews (Table 8) reveal that respondents saw that legal awareness,
either before or after the Presidential Instruction, as the main reason for
ceasing burning. This is evident through another 50% of program vil-
lages citing fear of prosecution as a reason (Table 7, Column e). Al-
though 50% of villages cited the Presidential Instruction No. 11/2015
(Table 7, Column a) as the main reason for stopping burning, another
58% cited fire bans in place prior to 2016 (Table 7, Column b) as a
reason for stopping burning. The pre-2016 fire ban (Table 7, Column b)
refers to the initiative of the local police that issued a local instruction
detailing the illegality of burning in 2014 (Maklumat Kapolda Riau
Nomor MAK/1/III/2014). This instruction was then disseminated by
APRIL as part of the FFV Program (Table 7, Column d), with the support
of the police, in both the program and non-program villages, which
highlighted the illegality of burning as stated in the Law No. 32/2009
on Environmental Protection and Management. Some of these in-
formation dissemination activities took place in May 2015
(Klikriau.com 2015). All of the villages stated that the effective dis-
semination of information regarding burning was a reason for stopping
burning.
Among the program villages, 50% specifically cited the FFV
Program as being a reason for stopping burning, which referred to both
the incentive component and dissemination of information about the
legal consequences of burning (Table 7, Column c). Around 33% of
villages stated that prior understanding of the impacts of fires, parti-
cularly negative health impacts, was one of the main drivers of the shift
of behavior from burning to non-burning (Table 7, Column f). Other
reasons (Table 7, Column g), such as shortages of available land and
fear of fire spreading to adjacent land, were cited as reasons of stopping
burning by 33% of the program and non-program villages. Although
none of the villages admitted that burning is still practiced (Table 7,
Column h), one of the possible reasons is the fear of prosecution, as
Table 5 shows that fires occurred in both FFV Program and non-pro-
gram villages in 2016 and 2017. The reasons for the persistence of
burning in some places should be studied further.
The same rationale for not burning was even more strongly ex-
pressed in the individual interviews. About 63% of the overall number
Table 5
Hotspots in study villages from 2013 to 2017.
Villages Fire incidents (MODIS 1 km resolution)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
FFV program villages
Sering 8 0 0 0 0 8
Kuala Tolam 0 5 0 0 0 5
Kuala Panduk 6 8 0 0 0 14
Teluk Binjai 1 1 0 0 0 2
Teluk Meranti 46 42 15 0 0 103
Segamai 1 0 3 3 4 11
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir 0 35 0 0 0 35
Kerumutan 9 1 9 0 0 19
Lalang Kabung 0 1 0 0 0 1
Mak Teduh 2 0 0 0 0 2
Pangkalan Terap 4 11 1 0 0 16
Segati 67 6 20 0 0 93
Table 6
Burnt area in study villages from 2013 to 2017.
Villages Burnt Area (MODIS 500m resolution)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
FFV program villages
Sering Ha 641 0 0 0 0 641
% of village area 7.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Kuala Tolam Ha 411 45 0 48 24 528
% of village area 1.27% 0.14% 0.00% 0.15% 0.07%
Kuala Panduk Ha 402 37 233 0 0 672
% of village area 1.70% 0.16% 0.98% 0.00% 0.00%
Teluk Binjai Ha 68 167 0 0 0 235
% of village area 0.14% 0.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Teluk Meranti Ha 4100 573 579 24 24 5300
% of village area 2.58% 0.36% 0.36% 0.02% 0.02%
Segamai Ha 235 684 98 0 0 1017
% of village area 5.21% 15.17% 2.17% 0.00% 0.00%
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir Ha 0 0 0 0 0 0
% of village area 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Kerumutan Ha 957 214 967 0 24 2162
% of village area 2.19% 0.49% 2.21% 0.00% 0.05%
Lalang Kabung Ha 113 0 0 0 0 113
% of village area 1.57% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Mak Teduh Ha 524 0 19 48 0 590
% of village area 1.66% 0.00% 0.06% 0.15% 0.00%
Pangkalan Terap Ha 1522 119 0 24 0 1665
% of village area 5.78% 0.45% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00%
Segati Ha 4548 429 902 129 0 6009
% of village area 6.03% 0.57% 1.20% 0.17% 0.00%
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Fig. 1. Hotspot (MODIS) density in program and non-program villages in 2013–2017.
Table 7
Reasons for no longer burning discussed in village focus groups.
Village Reasons
Fire ban
(2016)
Fire ban (before
2016)
FFV program (APRIL or
ASIAN AGRI)
Effective
socialization
Fear of
prosecution
Understanding of negative
impacts of fires
Other Still burning
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
FFV program villages
Sering x x x x x
Kuala Tolam x x x x
Kuala Panduk x x x x x
Teluk Binjai x x x x
Teluk Meranti x x x
Segamai x x x
Total count 3 (50%) 4 (67%) 3 (50%) 6 (100%) 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 2 (33%) 0
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir x x x
Lalang Kabung x x x
Kerumutan x x
Mak Teduh x x x
Pangkalan Terap x x x
Segati x x
Total count 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 0 6 (100%) 1 (17%) 1 (17%) 2 (33%) 0
Overall count 6 (50%) 7(58%) 3 (25%) 12 (100%) 4 (33%) 4 (33%) 4 (33%) 0
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of respondents indicated that the fire ban prior to 2016 was the main
reason for stopping burning (Table 8, Column b). In program villages,
this figure was even higher at 77% and in non-program villages, 50% of
respondents cited it as a reason. Fewer respondents cited the ban en-
forced in 2016 as a reason for stopping burning, with only 17% of re-
spondents in the program villages and 27% of respondents in the non-
program villages (Table 8, Column a). This reflects the trend described
in the focus group discussions where people described stopping burning
either prior or during 2015 as a result of the fire ban. This is related to
the issuance of the local instruction banning burning that was dis-
seminated by APRIL as part of the FFV Program, with the support of the
police, in both the target and non-program villages. In contrast to the
focus group discussions, only 20% of respondents in the program vil-
lages cited the FFV Program as the specific reason for stopping burning,
although this referred to both the incentive and legal compliance
components (Table 8, Column c).
During the focus group discussions and individual interviews,
respondents described several pathways for adjusting to the restrictions
imposed on the use of fire for agricultural purposes. The most typical
response of farmers was to shift to plantation crops such as oil palm and
rubber (Tables 9 and 10). In the focus group discussions, 75% of the
villages described a trend where they moved to plantation crops prior to
2016, while another 33% of villages shifted to other crops in 2016 or
after (Table 9, Column b and c). Another 42% described adapting to the
fire ban by shifting to non-farming livelihoods, including fishing, trade
and labor (Table 9, Column d). Finally, 83% stated that they continued
to farm the same crops, including plantation crops, without burning
(Table 9, Column a). None of the respondents stated that there was no
effect from stopping burning. In all of the program and study villages at
the time of the interviews, people farmed either oil palm (50%) or
rubber (23%) or both (Table 12). Alternative livelihoods included
fishing (12%), labor (< 17%), business (5%) or the civil service (8%)
(Table 11). The cultivation of staple crops, such as rice and corn, which
were formerly farmed in swidden systems, only represented< 1% of
Table 8
Reasons for stopping burning (respondents in individual interviews).
Village Reasons
Fire ban
(2016)
Fire ban (before
2016)
FFV program (APRIL or
ASIAN AGRI)
Effective
socialization
Fear of
prosecution
Understanding of negative
impacts of fires
Other Still burning
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
FFV program villages (n=30)
Sering 0 3 2 1 0 2 1 0
Kuala Tolam 3 2 1 3 0 1 0 0
Kuala Panduk 1 4 2 1 2 1 0 0
Teluk Binjai 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0
Teluk Meranti 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 0
Segamai 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 0
Total count 5 (17%) 23 (77%) 6 (20%) 6 (20%) 9 (37%) 4 (13%) 1 (0.3%) 0
Non-program villages (n=30)
Benteng Hilir 0 3 0 2 0 0 2 0
Lalang Kabung 0 2 1 4 2 0 1 0
Kerumutan 2 3 0 3 2 0 0 0
Mak Teduh 3 1 2 0 0 1 2 0
Pangkalan Terap 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 0
Segati 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 1
Total count 8 (27%) 15 (50%) 4 (13%) 11 (37%) 6 (20%) 1 (0.3%) 5 (17%) 1 (0.3%)
Overall count 13 (22%) 38 (63%) 10 (17%) 17 (28%) 15 (25%) 5 (8%) 6 (10%) 1 (0.15%)
Table 9
Effects of stopping burning (focus groups).
Village Effects
Farming the same crops, but no
longer burning
Shifted to plantation/agroforestry
crops
Shifted to plantation/agroforestry crops
(Pre-2016)
Shifted to other
livelihoods
No effects
(a) (b) (c) (d)
FFV program villages
Sering X X
Kuala Tolam X X
Kuala Panduk X X X
Teluk Binjai X X X
Teluk Meranti X
Segamai X X X
Total count 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 5 (83%) 3 (50%) 0
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir X X
Lalang Kabung X X
Kerumutan X X X
Mak Teduh X X
Pangkalan Terap X X X
Segati X X
Total count 6 (100%) 2 (33%) 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 0
Overall count 10 (83%) 4 (33%) 9 (75%) 5 (42%) 0
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the livelihoods in the villages at the time of the focus group discussions.
Land-use transitions away from swidden agriculture supported re-
ductions in burning generally and were relatively marked (rapid) in
FFV program villages. Among four of the six program villages, the
transition from swidden farming generally occurred between 2014 until
2016 (Table 13, Column a and f), mainly due to information dis-
semination on the illegality of burning. Rice and maize fields in these
villages were generally replaced with oil palm and rubber (Table 13,
Column d and i). In two of the program villages, farmers continue to
cultivate either rice or maize but not as extensively as before. In the
village of Segamai, the reason for stopping burning was the prosecution
of a farmer for burning in the village as a result of the stricter prohi-
bitions on burning after 2015 (Table 13, Column h). Among the non-
program villages, around 50% of the respondents described a transition
of swidden rice farming to oil palm, starting around the year 1993 in
one village and the year 2000 in two others (Table 13, Column a, f, d
and i). Rice farming only continued in one of the villages, Mak Teduh,
although burning ceased in 2016 as a result of the ban. Maize farming
has been more persistent, although in smaller percentages and,
according to the respondents, without burning.
In general, the reasons for ceasing burning were largely motivated
by legal awareness and fear of prosecution, supported by a broader
transition to oil palm and rubber across the landscape. Despite the lack
of attribution of the FFV Program as a reason for ceasing burning, most
respondents in the focus group discussions described the incentives as
having benefits for the village. The majority saw the benefits of the
program as being through improved public infrastructure and ame-
nities, such as roads, public markets and mosques (67%) (Table 14,
Column b), while others cited improved governance (33%) and im-
proved village government infrastructure, such as village administra-
tion offices (17%) (Table 14, Column a and c). Only one of the villages
described the shift to mechanical land clearing methods as a benefit of
the program (Table 14, Column e). From the individual interviews, 47%
of people saw no direct benefits to themselves (Table 15, Column e),
while 30% highlighted improved public infrastructure as a benefit
(Table 15, Column b), with few other benefits cited. No respondents
mentioned that “no fires” was considered as a benefit. This may reflect
their interpretation of the question as referring only to how the
Table 10
Effects of stopping burning (individual interviews).
Village Effects
Farming the same crops, but no
longer burning
Shifted to plantation/agroforestry
crops
Shifted to plantation/agroforestry crops
(Pre-2016)
Shifted to other
livelihoods
No effects
(a) (b) (c) (d)
FFV program villages
Sering 1 1 2 0 1
Kuala Tolam 0 0 5 0 1
Kuala Panduk 2 1 2 1 0
Teluk Binjai 0 1 3 0 0
Teluk Meranti 0 0 3 1 0
Segamai 0 0 3 0 0
Total count 3 (10%) 3 (10%) 18 (60%) 2 (7%) 2 (7%)
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir 3 2 1 3 0
Lalang Kabung 5 0 0 0 0
Kerumutan 1 2 3 0 1
Mak Teduh 2 1 3 0 1
Pangkalan Terap 0 3 1 2 0
Segati 0 0 1 0 2
Total count 11 (37%) 8 (27%) 9 (30%) 5 (17%) 4 (13%)
Overall count 14 (23%) 11 (18%) 27 (45%) 7 (12%) 6 (10%)
Table 11
Current livelihoods of communities (as estimated during focus group discussions).
Village Livelihoods
Farming Fishing Livestock Trade/Labor Entrepreneur Civil service
FFV program villages
Sering 25% 30% 5% 20% 0% 20%
Kuala Tolam 80% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0%
Kuala Panduk 85% 10% 0% 0% 5% 0%
Teluk Binjai 50% 10% 0% 40% 0% 0%
Teluk Meranti 70% 30% 0% 0% 10% 0%
Segamai 70% 10% 0% 0% 0% 20%
Total percentage 63% 17% 0.8% 12% 3% 7%
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir 55% 1% 0% 15% 0% 30%
Lalang Kabung 25% <1% <1% 95% 0% <1%
Kerumutan 80% 0% 0% 7% 7% 7%
Mak Teduh 90% 70% 0% 5% 0% 0%
Pangkalan Terap 78% 15% 0% 0% 25% 8%
Segati 90% 0% 0% <1% 5% 5%
Total percentage 68% 7% <0.2% <21% 6% 9%
Overall percentage 66% 12% 0.5% <17% 5% 8%
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incentives provided by the scheme were used rather than the benefits to
the community in general.
6. Discussion
The results of the study indicate that the incentive component of the
Fire Free Village Program had an effect other than just inducing a vo-
luntary behavior, in this case restricting the use of fire. Rather, the
incentives were introduced as part of a comprehensive, private sector
program that also included disseminating information about the laws
governing burning and the legal consequences of non-compliance. Or,
more simply, part of a program that included rewards and described
potential sanctions for non-compliance. The dissemination of informa-
tion on the sanctions for non-compliance also involved cooperation
with the local government as well as representatives from law en-
forcement agencies. As this information dissemination process occurred
in both the program and some of the non-program villages during 2015,
it reduced some of the expected differences between the program and
non-program villages. In general, however, during 2015, the program
villages experienced 40% fewer fires, while in non-program villages,
there were 23% more fires.
Compliance with these laws, however, did not occur in isolation.
Respondents described a transition from swidden subsistence crops to
plantation crops, in particular oil palm and rubber as well as non-
farming livelihoods. In general, farmers in the villages were either
cultivating alternative crops on separate plots or were in villages that
already were cultivating these crops, simplifying the transition to per-
manent crops when the fire bans were implemented. Many of these
changes occurred prior to the Presidential Instruction issued late in
2015 and reflect broader regional changes (Clough et al. 2016; Rogers
2016). The issuance of this regulation cemented the trajectory that had
begun several years before.
The study consequently does not either present a simple case study
for the effectiveness of voluntary incentives nor the effectiveness of
strict compliance regimes. The inception of the program either coin-
cided or was preceded by information dissemination of the illegality of
burning. The intention of the program was to restrict burning during a
nominated burning season (July – September). In some situations,
however, the information was disseminated in the presence of the po-
lice, who presented the program as a strict ban and highlighted the
severity of the consequences of non-compliance (Klikriau.com 2015).
Although the local interpretation of the relevant laws was fairly strict,
and supported by a local police department decree, the underlying
national laws at the time allowed some burning by smallholders.
Consequently, despite there being the potential for the program to in-
centivize voluntary changes in practices and behaviors prior to 2016,
many respondents understood it as a strict fire ban. These results con-
firm the conclusions of other studies that have demonstrated that the
influence of state actors, in particular bureaucracies, in the im-
plementation of voluntary and market-based schemes cannot be ig-
nored (Giessen et al. 2016; Giessen and Sahide 2017; Krott et al. 2014).
Consequently, although private sector actors may prefer voluntary or
market-based instruments to achieve positive environmental outcomes,
collaboration with state actors and bureaucrats may produce unin-
tended results.
The fire ban is, for the most part, accelerating the existing small-
holder transition from swidden farming and other livelihoods to oil
palm and rubber (Cacho et al. 2014; Clough et al. 2016; Potter and
Badcock 2004). With the issuance of the local government instruction
banning fire in 2014, followed by the Presidential Instruction in late
2015, bans on the use of fire became strictly enforced at the local level,
leading to changes in livelihoods and land uses. Awareness programs,
followed by actual prosecutions were the motivating factors in most
villages. These transitions could be summarized as follows. Where
farmers had access to alternative land uses or livelihoods, they in-
tensified these activities, such as replacing maize and rice with oil palm.
Where farmers had no viable alternative, they continued farming
without burning or burning covertly and not reporting it. The patterns
found in the study sites reflect the trends reported in other recent re-
search in Sumatra, indicating a more systematic trend across the island
(Rohadi 2017). Although most of the farmers interviewed seemed able
to adapt to the fire bans, the consequence of these adaptation strategies
was replacing staple food crops with cash crops. Whether this affects
food security in the present or future was not addressed as part of this
study, although in one village, respondents reported now having to rely
on subsidized rice or purchasing rice from the market as a result of the
changes in farming.
Consequently, replicating the program or similar incentive instru-
ments across Indonesia should be considered carefully. Although
Indonesia has not experienced an El Niño event since that of 2015, the
strictly interpreted Presidential Instruction remains in force. Similarly,
the particular land use dynamics and drivers of deforestation found in
Riau province are not consistently found throughout Indonesia (Abood
et al. 2015; Bong et al. 2016; Praputra et al. 2016). Transitions to in-
dependent, smallholder oil palm production systems are contingent on
a range of factors, most importantly, is access to a mill (Byerlee et al.
2016; Corley and Tinker 2016). Rubber farmers are constrained by their
access to processing facilities although rubber can travel further
Table 12
Crops currently planted by farmers (as estimated during focus group discussions).
Village Livelihoods
Oil Palm Rubber Coconut Vegetables (e.g. Chilies) Corn Rice Fruit (e.g. Pineapple)
FFV program villages
Sering 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2%
Kuala Tolam 64% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Kuala Panduk 60% 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Teluk Binjai 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Teluk Meranti 56% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Segamai 42% 7% 21% 0% <1% 0% 0%
Total percentage 49% 20% 4% 0% <0.2% 0.5% 0.3%
Non-program villages
Benteng Hilir 50% 0% 0% 0% <1% 0% 5%
Lalang Kabung 25% 0% 0% 0% <1% 0% 0%
Kerumutan 64% 16% 0% 0% <1% 0% 0%
Mak Teduh 90% 40% 0% 0% 2% 5% 0%
Pangkalan Terap 8% 70% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Segati 63% 27% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total percentage 50% 26% 0% 0% <0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
Overall percentage 50% 23% 2% 0% <0.5% 0.7% 0.6%
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distances when dried (Belcher et al. 2004). In the absence of the pos-
sibility of cultivating palm oil or similar perennial crops, smallholders
in other parts of Indonesia would not be able to imitate these land-use
adaptations to the burning ban. In the context of this strict regulatory
environment, the most effective financial instruments for fire preven-
tion among smallholders and local communities should be measures for
assisting farmers to find alternatives to burning. Such assistance bun-
dles could include both alternative crops and cropping methods as well
as mechanical alternatives to clearing land. These should be supported
through local regulations to simplify the use of mechanical clearing
methods in smallholder plots. Other important elements for fire pre-
vention include disseminating information about the negative effects of
inappropriate burning, especially in relation to human health, which
could be supported by a person in the village who has the responsibility
for fire prevention and management, such as the Village Crew Leader.
For Indonesia to achieve its NDC, greenhouse gas emissions from
peatland and forest fires must be reduced. As part of its current strategy,
the Government of Indonesia records emissions from fire as part of the
59.2% of emissions from land use change (Republic of Indonesia 2017;
Wijedasa et al. 2018). The Indonesian government states that these
emissions should be mitigated through a landscape approach, including
regulatory instruments such as moratoriums on forest clearing and
peatland cultivation (Republic of Indonesia 2017). The ban on using
burning for land clearing can reduce emissions from deforestation and
the degradation of peatland and forests. The unintended consequence,
however, may be that diverse forest gardens (Belcher et al. 2005),
which form part of swidden systems, are replaced with monocultures of
oil palm and rubber, which may potentially increase greenhouse gas
emissions while affecting biological diversity (Pfund et al. 2011). The
effects of the fire ban on land use and land cover change as well as
biological diversity, especially on small-scale farms, should be studied
more systematically before assuming that it is an effective instrument
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
7. Conclusion
Despite the potential for using incentives for inducing positive en-
vironmental behaviors in Indonesia, the strict regulatory environment
preventing burning means that there is little room for inducing volun-
tary behavior. From the results of the study, incentives were used as a
means for collectively building awareness as well as better under-
standing regulatory requirements and collective action through pro-
viding collective benefits. Program villages performed better than the
non-program villages, especially during 2015, the first year of the
program and the El Niño year, indicating that the incentive program
induced a reduction in burning prior to the implementation of the fire
ban. The combination of incentives with a strict regulatory environ-
ment, however, accelerated an ongoing transition from swidden agri-
culture to more profitable crops such as oil palm and rubber.
As the preferred method of the Indonesian government for solving
environmental problems increasingly focuses on strict regulatory
measures, including bans on peatland use among others, the potential
for voluntary incentives is decreasing. Although the ban, supported by
incentives, may be effective in reducing the incidence of fire in villages
where there are easily accessible alternatives, in places where farmers
lack any viable alternatives they may be forced to illegally burn or face
hardship. The current regulatory environment also inadvertently ac-
celerates a transition to monocultural landscapes, with effects on bio-
logical diversity and food security. As an alternative approach, we
propose that incentives could be used to enable farmers to comply with
the regulations while reducing the harm caused by changing their ex-
isting livelihoods.
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Appendix A. Land use/cover classes
Table A.1
Equivalency of Land Use/Cover Classes As Observed by the Visual Interpretation of Landsat/
SPOT Imagery by Miettinen et al. (2016a) and the Automated MODIS Land-Cover Classifi-
cation of Miettinen et al. (2016b).
Automated MODIS classificationa Visual Landat/SPOT classification
Ocean/water –
Water Water
Mangrove Mangrove
Peatswamp forest Pristine PSF
Lowland evergreen forest
Regrowth/plantation Degraded PSF
Lowland mosaic Smallholder agriculture
Lowland open Cleared/burned
Montane open
Large scale palm plantations Plantation
a The urban and various montane land-cover classes of the automated MODIS classifica-
tion are omitted here because they were not present in the study villages. For the non-
peatland proportion of the study area covered only by the Automated MODIS classification,
the classes present in the left-hand column adopted the labels in the right-hand column, for
consistency with the remainder of the study area. The full set of classes for the visual
Landsat/SPOT classification is listed in Table 4.
Appendix B. Land cover area in target and non-program villages
Table B.1
Area (ha) of land cover in 2015 in target and non-program villages, Riau Province.
Village Ocean/
water
Water Seasonal
water
Pristine peat
swamp forest
Degraded peat
swamp forest
Tall shrub/secondary
peat swamp forest
Fern/low
shrub
Smallholder
agriculture
Plantation Cleared/
burned
Total area
FFV program villages
Kuala Tolam – 450 – 2756.25 6581.25 437.5 937.5 2475 18,631.25 712.5 32,981.25
Segamai 6.25 – – – – 68.75 – 3150 1337.5 – 4562.5
Sering – 556.25 – 550 1206.25 137.5 – 3756.25 2100 806.25 9112.5
Teluk Mera-
nti
6931.25 1250 1843.75 24,393.75 70,993.75 2218.75 4768.75 6150 39,206.25 2475 160,231.25
Kuala Pand-
uk
– 331.25 206.25 11,718.75 4512.5 – 225 2625 4337.5 37.5 23,993.75
Teluk Binjai 1981.25 75 18.75 25,693.75 10,843.75 543.75 – 3350 6012.5 12.5 48,531.25
Non-program villages
Lalang Kab-
ung
– – – 662.5 325 – 1718.75 3862.5 550 7118.75
Pangkalan
Terap
350 337.5 10,868.75 4325 75 150 3393.75 6118.75 618.75 26,237.5
Mak Teduh – 168.75 11,106.25 6893.75 1693.75 12.5 868.75 10,643.75 56.25 31,443.75
Kerumutan – 856.25 9587.5 11,343.75 1818.75 512.5 4043.75 13,756.25 1618.75 43,537.5
Segati – – 12.5 21,600 – – 25,825 8956.25 18,887.5 75,281.25
Benteng Hil-
ir
31.25 – – 868.8 – – 662.5 2206.25 75 3843.75
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